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Abstract. Artisanal fisheries support millions of livelihoods worldwide, yet ineffective enforcement
can allow for continued environmental degradation due to overexploitation. Here, we use spatial plan-
ning to design an enforcement strategy for a pre-existing spatial closure for artisanal fisheries consider-
ing climate variability, existing seasonal fishing closures, representative conservation targets and
enforcement costs. We calculated enforcement cost in three ways, based on different assumptions
about who could be responsible for monitoring the fishery. We applied this approach in the Patos
Lagoon estuary (Brazil), where we found three important results. First, spatial priorities for enforce-
ment were similar under different climate scenarios. Second, we found that the cost and percentage of
area enforced varied among scenarios tested by the conservation planning analysis, with only a modest
increase in budget needed to incorporate climate variability. Third, we found that spatial priorities for
enforcement depend on whether enforcement is carried out by a central authority or by the community
itself. Here, we demonstrated a method that can be used to efficiently design enforcement plans, result-
ing in the conservation of biodiversity and estuarine resources. Also, cost of enforcement can be
potentially reduced when fishers are empowered to enforce management within their fishing grounds.
Key words: artisanal fisheries; climate variability; enforcement; ENSO events; estuaries; marine spatial
planning; seasonal closures.
INTRODUCTION
Coastal lagoons and estuaries are among the most pro-
ductive ecosystems in the world, providing a range of
ecosystem services and aquatic resources. Estuaries act as
nurseries, feeding, and breeding areas for a wide variety of
animals including those of economic importance (Babler
2000). Conservation in estuaries is particularly challenging
due to conflicts among diverse sectors dependent on the
ecosystem. Yet because of their proximity to human popu-
lations, coastal and marine ecosystems have often been
degraded, leading to habitat degradation, species loss and
fisheries overexploitation (Sumaila et al. 2011, Arthington
et al. 2016). Artisanal fisheries are an important economic
activity in estuaries, supporting the livelihoods of many
people around the world. This activity has low operating
costs, small boats, few fishers per boat, and limited profit
(Kurien and Willmann 2009). In Brazil, artisanal fisheries
are data poor (Kaliloski and Vasconcellos 2012) even
though >50% of fishery production comes from this sector
(Vasconcellos et al. 2007). This makes it difficult to identify
and evaluate the effectiveness of management actions (e.g.,
enforcement, patrolling, or policies) to conserve estuarine
biodiversity.
To date, most Brazilian fisheries management has focused
on controls of catch, effort and technical regulations such as
restrictions on mesh size, closed seasons, and areas. Enforce-
ment typically encompasses patrols to detect and prosecute
illegal activities (Anderson 1989), which is expensive and in
practice often concentrated in areas with easy access from
the places where patrols are stationed (Plumptre et al. 2014).
Given limited resources for enforcement, there is scope to
strategically allocate resources in space and time to increase
the probability that enforcement reduces the amount of
poaching. Until now, fisheries enforcement and spatial con-
servation planning have tended to be separate, but it might
be possible to use ideas from conservation planning to opti-
mize enforcement, and thus, protect biodiversity at a mini-
mum cost. Conservation planning encompasses the spatial
allocation of conservation actions, based on the distribution
of conservation targets and the costs of those actions (Kuk-
kala and Moilanen 2013). If we consider that the main
objective of fisheries enforcement is to protect commercially
valuable species, we can combine fisheries data with conser-
vation planning to optimize the design of enforcement
strategies. Despite some studies considering the optimiza-
tion of enforcement in other systems (Ban et al. 2009,
Plumptre et al. 2014, Davis et al. 2015, Arias et al. 2016,
Dhanjal-Adams et al. 2016), we are still lacking a spatial
prioritization approach for fisheries enforcement that
includes variability in fish abundance (often driven by a vari-
able climate) and fishing effort.
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We applied our approach to the Patos Lagoon estuary
(PLE, Brazil), which borders a national protected area
established in the wetlands surrounding the Patos-Mirim
lagoon system on the Brazilian coastline (Odebrecht et al.
2010). Unlike many estuaries in the world, the PLE is
located in a micro-tidal region, with estuarine dynamics con-
trolled mainly by wind and precipitation (Odebrecht et al.
2010). Species composition, abundance and biomass vary in
space and time within the PLE in response to changes in
salinity and temperature, which are in turn affected by cli-
matic conditions (Odebrecht et al. 2010). Periods of peak
freshwater discharge are associated with El Ni~no episodes
when rainfall significantly increases, while La Ni~na events
are associated with drought conditions (Odebrecht et al.
2010). Due to the influence on salinity, these events affect
the distribution of several marine and freshwater species,
and consequently, the fisheries production in the estuary
(Odebrecht et al. 2010). Incorporating fish distribution into
an enforcement plan can contribute to better allocation of
law enforcement effort and consequently protect overex-
ploited target species and their habitats.
Here, we investigate whether the spatial priorities for
enforcement change seasonally and/or with respect to El
Ni~no Southern Oscillation (ENSO) variability, and how this
is affected by shifting enforcement responsibility from gov-
ernment to local communities. We used spatial planning
tools to design an enforcement strategy for a pre-existing
management plan for estuarine artisanal fisheries through
time and space, considering temporal variation in ENSO.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The artisanal fishery at the PLE
The PLE (Appendix S1) and adjacent shelf are among the
most important fishing grounds along the Brazilian coast
(Haimovici 1997). There is artisanal fishing throughout the
estuary, but it is concentrated in areas close to fishing com-
munities (Reis and D’Incao 2000), and supports at least
2,000 fishers (Kaliloski and Vasconcellos 2012). Trawl nets,
gillnets, and fyke nets are the main gears used in the estuary.
Artisanal fishery production varies from ~R$23 million to
R$46 million (Brazilian Reais) per year (i.e., $US7 million
to $US13 million) in a good fishing season (Kaliloski and
Vasconcellos 2012). Most target species are marine and use
the estuary to complete their life cycle: for example, the pink
shrimp Penaeus paulensis and the whitemouth croaker
Micropogonias furnieri migrate from the estuary to the
ocean to spawn (Odebrecht et al. 2010). Early life stages of
these species recruit to the PLE where they find suitable con-
ditions for fast growth, and protection against currents and
predators in the submerged Ruppia maritima meadows
(Garcia and Vieira 1997, Costa et al. 2014, Ruas et al.
2014). By contrast, the sea catfish Genidens barbus enters the
estuary in August and September to complete maturation,
and spawns in November and December. After that, females
return to the sea and males, which are mouth-breeders, keep
carrying their eggs until January and February (Haimovici
and Cardoso 2016). Since the 1980s, there has been a decline
in landings for all main target resources due to excessive
fishing effort, catches at inappropriate stages of their life
cycle, pollution, and illegal fishing (Haimovici 1997, Reis
and D’Incao 2000, Odebrecht et al. 2010, Kaliloski and
Vasconcellos 2012, Haimovici and Cardoso 2016).
Seasonal fishing closure, gear restrictions, minimum size,
licenses, spatial restrictions, and protection of spawning
grounds are the main fisheries management tools used in the
PLE to manage the artisanal fishery (Haimovici and Car-
doso 2016). However, they are poorly enforced. According
to the Brazilian fishery legislation, fishing for shrimp, mul-
let, croaker, and catfish in the PLE is forbidden during sev-
eral months of the year, although the majority of fishers
continue to catch these species throughout the year (Kali-
loski and Vasconcellos 2012). See Appendix S2 for further
information about the study area.
Spatial prioritization approach
We used the decision support tool Marxan (Ball et al.
2009) with a probabilistic spatial prioritization approach to
determine an enforcement strategy for artisanal fisheries at
the PLE through time and space. Marxan uses a simulated
annealing algorithm to find alternative good solutions to
create minimum cost reserves (Ball et al. 2009). Marxan
with probability is a modified version of Marxan that mini-
mizes the cost of selected planning units, subject to the
achievement of conservation targets with an acceptably low
risk (Game et al. 2008). We aimed to protect 25% of each of
our main species considered in the seasonal fishing closure
and 10% of the remaining estuarine biodiversity for each
scenario tested. Our targets were set following the Aichi Bio-
diversity Targets (Convention on Biological Diversity 2013),
which aims to protect at least 10% of coastal and marine
areas by 2020. As our target species are currently overex-
ploited they were given a higher target to increase the chance
of recovery of the population.
TABLE 1. Details for each climate groups (scenarios), costs, and seasonal fishing closure design implemented in the spatial prioritization
for enforcement using Marxan with Probability. Here, we analysed three different cost layers and four seasonal fishing targets for each
climate scenario.
Climate groups (scenarios) Costs Seasonal fishing closure design
1. Ignoring climate variability enforcement Autumn: whitemouth croaker (25%) and other conservation
features (10%)
2. Considering climate variability (seasonal
scenarios for each ENSO intensity)
enforcement by
fishers
Winter: whitemouth croaker (25%), catfish (25%), pink shrimp
(25%), and other conservation features (10%)
3. Considering climate variability as
conservation features (seasonal scenarios)
distance from fishing
colony
Spring: whitemouth croaker (25%), catfish (25%), pink shrimp
(25%), and other conservation features (10%)
Summer: pink shrimp (25%) and other conservation features (10%)
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In this prioritization approach, we used information about
the probability a planning unit contains suitable habitats for
our three target species (whitemouth croaker, pink shrimp,
and catfish). The Marxan with probabilities software selects
enough planning units so that the species that does not meet
its target is acceptably low. To implement this approach, we
required data about the probability that each planning unit is
within their suitable habitats. For that, we used the proba-
bilistic output from our MaxEnt distribution models (soft-
ware version 3.3; Appendix S2) to estimate this probability.
MaxEnt is a species distribution modelling tool that uses
presence-only data to predict the distribution of a species
based on environmental variables (Phillips and Dudik 2008).
As our objective is to minimize the chance that the selected
planning units are not suitable for the occurrence of our tar-
get species in addition to minimize the cost of enforcement,
we estimated our habitat suitability probability (HS) as
HS ¼ 1 P
where P is the probability of occurrence derived from our
Maxent outputs.
To prioritize enforcement spatially during seasonal fishing
closures at the PLE, we used Marxan with probability to
evaluate three alternative climate scenario groups, which
varied based on whether they considered climate variability
and on their associated management complexity (see
Table 1). Every group of scenarios included prioritizations
for enforcement within different seasons. Group 1 scenarios
ignored climate variability (i.e., ignoring ENSO). Group 2
scenarios considered climate variability (i.e., varying intensi-
ties of ENSO: weak, moderate, and very strong events); so,
there was an enforcement prioritization for every season and
every ENSO intensity (20 scenarios in total). Group 3 sce-
narios considered climate variability (i.e., species distribu-
tions layers for each ENSO intensity) as conservation
features, so similar to Group 1 there was only one scenario
per season but the variation in the distribution of fish
associated with different ENSO intensities was captured.
Groups 1 and 3 scenarios represent a simpler approach to
manage enforcement (four prioritizations) when compared
to Group 2 scenarios (20 prioritizations). For each scenario,
Marxan with probability was calibrated and all scenarios
were run with 100 repetitions and 1,000,000 iterations. We
decided to not spatially cluster the selected sites to ensure
that we achieved the most cost-efficient solutions. In
addition, we set the target probability as 90%, which means
the selected sites have a 90% chance of meeting the selected
target.
Expected benefit of enforcement
Even though the temporal closure was designed specifi-
cally to protect the pink shrimp, catfish, mullet, and
FIG. 1. Spatial priorities for enforcement of artisanal fisheries in the Patos Lagoon estuary when ignoring El Ni~no Southern Oscillation
(ENSO) intensities (Group 1) and when incorporating spatial distribution of species during distinct ENSO intensities as conservation fea-
tures (Group 3). Selection frequency is how often a planning unit is selected across 100 runs under each scenario. Here, the cost layer used
was the estimated enforcement cost by the government.
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whitemouth croaker, our spatial planning approach has two
objectives: to spatially prioritize enforcement, and to maxi-
mize biodiversity protection while minimizing enforcement
costs. In this sense, we considered 38 estuarine species as a
surrogate for biodiversity across the estuary, including the
three species regulated by the seasonal closure legislation
(pink shrimp, catfish, and whitemouth croaker). We also
included key biophysical features including bathymetry, sed-
iment type, and submerged aquatic vegetation. In total, 64
conservation features were considered (details on the specific
target used for each feature are listed on Table 1). Our
expected benefit is a proxy for the biomass left in the system
that otherwise would be removed by the artisanal fishery,
and it was estimated as the value of a conservation feature
in a planning unit multiplied by an estimated fishing effort.
We estimated fishing effort based on the human population
and distance from each fishing colony (Kaliloski and
Vasconcellos 2012), as fishers tend to fish closer to their
colonies (Freitas and Tagliani 2009, Kaliloski and Vascon-
cellos 2012).
Expected cost of enforcement
We analysed these scenarios using three different cost lay-
ers: (1) enforcement cost, (2) enforcement cost by engaging
with fishers, and (3) distance from fishing colonies (Table 1).
Our approach to calculating the cost of enforcement (Ce) was
based on Dhanjal-Adams et al. (2016). The enforcement cost
was proportional to the number of rangers (N), monthly sal-
ary (S), staff on-cost (25%, Ban et al. 2009), the time spent
enforcing each planning unit (E), the price per kilometer of
travel, and the distance in kilometers to each planning unit
(D). We estimated the maximum possible hourly salary for a
ranger at R$33.53 (MTFCGU 2016). We also assumed that
three rangers always patrolled the PLE for 5 h per day. We
estimated the price per kilometer of travel (P) as R$1.67
based on 2.5-L engine and fuel costs. Then, assuming that
patrolling always starts from the Regional Environmental
Agency, we estimated its distance (D) to each planning unit.
Our enforcement cost was estimated to be
Ce ¼ 1:25NSE þ PD
for a planning unit. We also considered a more community-
based scenario, where fishers are empowered by the govern-
ment to enforce management within their fishing grounds.
The Brazilian government already pays a fishing insurance
(minimum national wage) for artisanal fishers when fishing
is closed to four species in the PLE. To estimate this cost
layer, we modified the first equation by excluding the num-
ber of rangers and staff on-costs. We assumed that the salary
is the hourly rate of the minimum national wage. This cost
layer represents the cost of seven fishers (e.g., one from each
fishing colony considered in this study) engaging in a co-
management of estuarine resources. In this scenario, fishers
are responsible for patrolling, capturing the benefits of man-
agement, and minimizing illegal activities during the fishing
closure. Our third cost layer was estimated using the dis-
tance of each planning unit to the nearest fishing colony.
We compared our selection frequency results for two cli-
mate scenarios groups: seasonal scenarios without ENSO
and seasonal scenarios with varying intensities of ENSO.
We used the Pearson correlation coefficient (q) to test the
similarity between the selection frequency results. A high
correlation indicates similar spatial priorities for enforce-
ment. We only considered the correlation coefficients when
comparing our results, as these are unaffected by spatial
autocorrelation (Nhancale and Smith 2011).
RESULTS
Spatial priorities for enforcement were similar across
ENSO intensities (Fig. 1, Appendix S3: Fig. S2 to S5;
q > 0.70; Table 2), although there were differences in cost
and the amount of area selected for enforcement (Fig. 2). For
example, during El Ni~no events we would need to enforce an
average of 628 km2 at an average total cost of R$141,000
while, during La Ni~na years, we would need to enforce an
average of 615 km2 at an average total cost of R$129,200
based on Group 2 scenarios (Fig. 2). Enforcement scenarios
ignoring climate variability (Group 1) had a relatively higher
TABLE 2. Pearson correlation coefficients (q) applied to test the
similarity between the selection frequency results for each group
of scenarios.
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Winter Spring Summer Autumn
El Ni~no
(a) Weak
Winter 0.81
Spring 0.83
Summer 0.79
Autumn 0.81
(b) Moderate
Winter 0.78
Spring 0.84
Summer 0.82
Autumn 0.81
(c) Very strong
Winter 0.81
Spring 0.88
Summer 0.83
Autumn 0.84
La Ni~na
(a) Weak
Winter 0.74
Spring 0.81
Summer 0.77
Autumn 0.77
(b) Moderate
Winter 0.85
Spring 0.80
Summer 0.77
Autumn 0.80
Scenario 3
Winter 0.77
Spring 0.74
Summer 0.74
Autumn 0.80
Note: All results were significant at the level of P < 0.001.
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average total cost and area, R$156,000 and 650 km2 respec-
tively, when compared to ENSO scenarios from Group 2.
Enforcement was more expensive in winter because partic-
ular sites would always be selected for enforcement (i.e., they
were irreplaceable), while in spring larger areas needed to be
protected because fish distributions were larger. Scenarios
considering climate variability as conservation features (i.e.,
in an integrated manner, Group 3) were more expensive (av-
erage cost = R$187,800) than scenarios ignoring climate
variability (Group 1), however it enforced a larger area
(694 km2). While scenarios ignoring climate variability
(Group 1) are cheaper than scenarios including climate vari-
ability as conservation features (Group 3); by increasing our
enforcement budget by 20% (R$ 10,000/month) we can
incorporate climate variability into the enforcement plan.
This could lead to an increase of more than 40 km2 in the
mean area enforced (Fig. 2). In general, areas in the main
channel and in shallow waters close to the estuarine shore
were the most important for protection and enforcement
regardless of the season, because these were cheaper to
patrol and important for biodiversity.
Empowering fishers to enforce their own fishing ground
emerged as the most efficient strategy for an enforcement
plan at PLE. Spatial priorities differed with changes in
responsibility for the enforcement (Fig. 3, Appendix S3). In
this case, mean cost decreased by 47% and 55% when fishers
were empowered to monitor their own fishing ground in the
scenario ignoring climate variability (Group 1) and scenar-
ios considering climate variability as conservation features
(Group 3), respectively (Fig. 2). The mean area patrolled
was also increased, since more area could be considered in
the enforcement plan (Figs. 2 and 3) for less money.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we provided an example of how spatial pri-
oritization can be used to design enforcement plans, using
Patos Lagoon estuary as an example. In our case study, we
designed an enforcement strategy for a pre-existing spatial
closure for artisanal fisheries considering climate variability,
existing seasonal fishing closures, representative conserva-
tion targets, and enforcement costs.
Law enforcement is needed to reduce illegal activities such
as non-compliance with marine protected areas, seasonal clo-
sures, and restrictions on gear and size (Game et al. 2009,
Edgar et al. 2014). In this context, the approach we
FIG. 2. Cost and area selected to enforce the artisanal fishery in the Patos Lagoon estuary. Results displayed in this graph represent sce-
narios from Group 1, 2 and 3: (A) El Ni~no and (B) La Ni~na, (C) enforcement by environmental agency, and (D) enforcement by fishers.
1454 MICHELI DUARTE DE PAULACOSTA ET AL.
Ecological Applications
Vol. 28, No. 6
demonstrated here is timely considering the current concerns
around illegal fishing. While there has been prioritizations for
enforcement (Ban et al. 2009, Plumptre et al. 2014, Davis
et al. 2015, Arias et al. 2016, Dhanjal-Adams et al. 2016),
none considered variation through time. We found that spa-
tial priorities for enforcement varied markedly among sea-
sons, indicating that temporally dynamic enforcement is
needed in this system. In contrast, and somewhat unexpect-
edly, priorities did not change substantially for different cli-
mate scenarios. We also found that spatial priorities changed
based on who is responsible for patrols, suggesting that cost
of enforcement is reduced when fishers themselves enforce
their fishing grounds. Marine protected areas that are well
enforced, were developed with fishers participation, and that
promote sustainable fishing were found to have healthier fish
stocks and fishers with higher income compared to those that
did not (Di Franco et al. 2016). We could expect the same
benefits for a well-enforced seasonal closure.
Considering climate variability to enforce the seasonal
closures in the PLE
Artisanal fishing in the PLE is only one of multiple activities
that can impact the ecological health of the estuarine ecosys-
tem. Previous studies in this estuary show that climate change
is already having an impact, decreasing the productivity, and
consequently, reducing fisheries stock (Odebrecht et al. 2010,
Haimovici and Cardoso 2016). One expected impact of climate
change in southern Brazil is an increase in frequency and
intensity of extreme events such as ENSOs (PBMC 2014).
Thus, conservation plans (i.e., enforcement or the design of
marine protected areas) could consider climate variability.
While fishing is prohibited in the PLE during the seasonal
closure, a high percentage of fishers declare that they usually
fish during the closure (Kaliloski and Vasconcellos 2012). A
seasonal enforcement plan can be a cost-effective solution
(i.e., better outcomes achieved given the amount of resources
spent) to decrease illegal fishing in the PLE, where temporal
variation plays an important role in determining fish distribu-
tion. We found that it is possible to optimize enforcement for
the pre-existing seasonal closure. However, it is important to
highlight that other forms of management that are in place
(e.g., gear restrictions, minimum sizes, licenses, etc.) will still
need spatial plans to be efficiently enforced.
In the PLE, most of the fisheries collapsed as long ago as
the 1980s due to overexploitation (Haimovici and Cardoso
2016). For example, the abundance of whitemouth croaker
and the age of older fishes in the catch have been decreasing
for decades (Haimovici and Cardoso 2016). In addition to
the fisheries that target this species, the fyke nets used to
caught pink shrimp also capture a large number of juveniles
of fish (Vieira et al. 1996). Many countries lack the
resources for fisheries management, resulting in a total or
partial fish stock collapse around the world (Anderson
FIG. 3. Spatial priorities for enforcement of artisanal fisheries in the Patos Lagoon estuary when incorporating spatial distribution of
species in distinct ENSO intensities as conservation features (Group 3). Selection frequency is how often a planning unit is selected across
100 runs under each scenario. Here, the cost layers used were the estimated enforcement cost by the environmental agency, and the opportu-
nity cost using the distance from the fishing colonies as a proxy for enforcement cost by fishers.
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1989, Pomeroy and Berkes 1997, Agnew et al. 2009, Arias
et al. 2016, Arthington et al. 2016) and in Brazil (Reis and
D’Incao 2000, Kaliloski and Vasconcellos 2012).
A potential enforcement plan for the PLE, where federal
environmental agencies work together with artisanal fishers
to effectively enforce and protect estuarine resources and
biodiversity can be represented by Group 3 (scenarios
including climate variability as conservation features;
Fig. 4). It has been proposed that co-management can
increase the efficiency of fisheries management (Pomeroy
and Berkes 1997) and enhance fishers perception of conser-
vation (Gelcich et al. 2008). Fisheries co-management has
already been considered by managers in the PLE, with the
creation of the Forum of Patos Lagoon in 1996 (Reis and
Rodrigues 2003). However, the sharing of responsibilities
between the government and fishing communities in the
PLE has not yet been considered (Kaliloski and Vasconcel-
los 2012). Here, we showed that empowering fishers to
enforce their own fishing grounds in a community-based
management is a potential cost-effective strategy to reduce
law enforcement costs and increase the sustainability of estu-
arine resources and biodiversity.
Challenges for spatial prioritization for enforcement
Our approach for spatially prioritizing enforcement can
be used to design fisheries enforcement plans and modified
to address different enforcement needs. We acknowledge
that prioritizing enforcement represents a substantial practi-
cal challenge, which ideally uses spatial data on poaching
and better estimates the cost of enforcement. For example,
our case study did not account for the actual behavior of
illegal fishers or any existing spatial patterns of illegal fish-
ing, such as areas of high prevalence of illegal fishing and/or
infractions. Unfortunately, there is no such data available
for Patos Lagoon estuary. However, as artisanal fishers in
the Patos Lagoon estuary generally operate close to their
colonies and are loyal to their fishing grounds (Freitas and
Tagliani 2009, Kaliloski and Vasconcellos 2012), we believe
that our estimates of the spatial pattern is not unrealistic.
We believe that incorporating these data on species abun-
dance and/or the distribution of each type of fishing gear in
the estuary into spatial planning may improve the design of
the enforcement plan, and better estimate the associated
benefits. A previous study in Chile (Davis et al. 2015)
assessed the impact of enforcement of marine protected
areas on species abundance and found that the revenue for
fishers increased with enforcement; economic benefits were
greater than enforcement costs where poaching is prevented.
In conclusion, we demonstrated an approach that can be
useful to managers from data-poor regions by offering a
way to prioritize which areas could be included in an
enforcement strategy. However, in cases where managers
have spatial data on patterns of illegal fishing and real data
on costs of enforcement, we do recommend that these layers
are incorporated into the plan.
FIG. 4. Co-participative enforcement plan proposed to protect estuarine resources and biodiversity at the Patos Lagoon estuary. This
plan is based on the selection frequency results (≥80%) from scenarios including climate variability as conservation features (Group 3): (A)
winter, (B) spring, (C) summer, and (D) autumn).
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